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After Life: Governmental Interests and
the New Antiabortion Incrementalism
MARY ZIEGLER*
In the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, commentators have
focused on the effect of antiabortion restrictions. But as this
Article shows, Whole Woman’s Health is part of the story of
an equally important tactic used by those chipping away at
abortion rights: the recognition of new governmental interests justifying abortion regulations. Using original archival
research, this Article traces the rise of this strategy and documents its influence on Supreme Court doctrine, making
sense of what seem to be contradictory rulings on abortion.
How should courts deal with novel legislative purposes
or broader interpretations of existing ones? The Court’s recent decision in Whole Woman’s Health clarified that courts
must weigh the degree to which a statute delivers on the benefits it promises, but the Court raised as many questions as
it answered. To better ground judicial analysis of governmental interests, this Article proposes a two-step approach.
As an initial matter, states should have to articulate a
claimed purpose with enough specificity that would enable
courts to measure whether a law is succeeding. Then, in
evaluating whether a law advances its stated goal, a court
should consider: (1) whether a law addresses a measurable
problem; (2) whether the law improves on the results
achieved by previous policies; and (3) whether the law has
some quantifiable (if not numerically specific) benefit. Creating a framework with which to analyze any new purposes
proposed by states to justify abortion regulations will provide more consistency, clarity, and coherence for
*
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legislatures and lower courts. The approach suggested in
this Article will help ensure that the Court preserves the balance crafted by Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey and Whole Woman’s Health.
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INTRODUCTION
Those studying the abortion wars have focused on the effect of
antiabortion restrictions. 1 However, as this Article shows, the
Court’s recent decision in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt2 is
part of the story of an equally important tactic used by those chipping away at abortion rights: creating new governmental interests to
1

See, e.g., Andrea D. Friedman, Bad Medicine: Abortion and the Battle
Over Who Speaks for Women’s Health, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 51–52
(2013); Dawn Johnsen, “TRAP”ing Roe in Indiana and a Common-Ground Alternative, 118 YALE L.J. 1356, 1359 (2009); Mary Ziegler, Substantial Uncertainty: Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt and the Future of Abortion Law,
2016 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 85–90 (2016).
2
136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
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justify abortion regulations and expanding those interests that the
Court has already dignified. Using original archival research, this
Article traces the rise of this strategy and documents its influence on
Supreme Court doctrine, making sense of what seem to be contradictory rulings on abortion. Major cases in this area often turn at
least partly on whether the Court will dignify a new governmental
justification for restricting abortion.3
How should courts deal with novel legislative purposes or
broader interpretations of existing ones? The Court’s recent decision
in Whole Woman’s Health clarified that courts must weigh the degree to which a statute delivers on the benefits it promises, but the
Court raised as many questions as it answered.4 To better ground
judicial analysis of governmental interests, this Article proposes a
two-step approach. As an initial matter, states should have to articulate a claimed purpose with enough specificity that courts can
measure whether a law succeeds in meeting its stated purpose. Abstract, obscure goals, such as enhancing respect for fetal dignity,
should give way to concrete, tangible benefits. Next, in evaluating
whether a law advances its stated goal, a court should consider: (1)
whether a law addresses a measurable problem; (2) whether the law
improves on the results achieved by previous policies; and (3)
whether the law has some quantifiable (if not numerically specific)
benefit. Analyzing abortion regulations under this framework will
provide more consistency, clarity, and coherence for legislatures and
lower courts. The approach suggested here will help to ensure that
the Court maintains the balance that Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 5 and Whole Woman’s Health 6
crafted.
This Article proceeds in six parts. Part I surveys some of the
major antiabortion legislation premised on the recognition of new
governmental interests in regulating abortion. Part II begins to place
these laws in historical context, tracing the origins of antiabortion
efforts to move beyond a governmental interest in protecting life
3

See, e.g., id.; Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
(plurality opinion); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. For Reprod. Health (Akron I),
462 U.S. 416 (1983).
4
See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309–10.
5
Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.
6
Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309–10.
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from the moment of conception. This Part focuses on the campaigns
for the recognition of two interests: (1) the protection of women and
(2) the protection of the family. As this Part shows, this effort shaped
the Court’s decisions from City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health (Akron I)7 to Casey. Part III examines pro-life efforts
to frame governmental interests in fetal life that go beyond the prevention of fetal killing, showing how this campaign influenced the
Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Carhart.8 Part IV begins by analyzing what Whole Woman’s Health does and does not clarify about
how courts should evaluate the claimed purpose of antiabortion legislation. Drawing on the history collected and analyzed in this Article, Part V proposes a clearer approach for courts dealing with new
governmental interests supporting abortion regulations.
I. BEYOND LIFE: NEW GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS
In the fall of 2017, the House of Representatives passed a ban
on abortions after the twentieth week of pregnancy.9 This proposal
appeared doomed in the Senate.10 However, seventeen states currently have such a ban in place.11 Proponents of a twenty-week ban,
including the National Right to Life Committee (“NRLC”) and
Americans United for Life (“AUL”), contend that such laws prevent
fetal pain. NRLC’s fact sheet on the Pain-Capable Unborn Child
Act, model legislation on the subject, stresses that there is “[e]xtensive evidence that unborn children have the capacity to experience

7

462 U.S. 416 (1983).
550 U.S. 124 (2007).
9
Jessie Hellmann, House Passes 20-Week Abortion Ban, HILL (Oct. 3,
2017), http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/353709-house-passes-20-week-abort
ion-ban; see also Anna North, The House Just Passed a Twenty Week Abortion
Ban. Opponents Say It’s “Basically Relying on Junk Science,” VOX (Jan. 29,
2018), https://www.vox.com/identities/2017/10/3/16401826/abortion-ban-paincapable-unborn-child-protection-act.
10
See, e.g., Ed Kilgore, House Passes Twenty-Week Abortion Ban on NearPerfect Party Line Vote, N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 3, 2017), http://nymag.com/daily/ intelligencer/2017/10/house-passes-20-week-abortion-ban-on-party-vote.html.
11
See, e.g., State Policies on Later Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST.,
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/state-policies-later-abortions
(last updated Oct. 1, 2018).
8
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pain, at least by 20 weeks fetal age.”12 AUL has also championed a
model law, the Women’s Health Defense Act, that bans abortion at
the same point.13 The organization justifies the ban because “there
is substantial and well-documented medical evidence that an unborn
child by at least 20 weeks gestation has the capacity to feel pain
during an abortion” and because there are “documented risks to
women’s health.”14
Twenty-week bans have captured the imagination of abortion
opponents partly because some polls indicate that a majority of voters would support such a law.15 However, twenty-week bans also
form part of a larger twist on antiabortion strategy: an effort to erode
abortion rights by convincing the courts to recognize new compelling interests justifying government intervention.
This approach represents a different take on antiabortion incrementalism, a strategy that first fell in place in the decade after Roe
v. Wade.16 This Part begins by briefly discussing the rise of pro-life
incrementalism. Next, this Part examines the new focus on identifying governmental interests in regulating abortion, exploring some of
the most significant new antiabortion proposals.
A. The Rise of Incrementalism
Opposition to legal abortion reaches back to the 1930s and
1940s, when the Catholic Church connected hostility to abortion to

12

Key Points on Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act, NAT’L RIGHT
LIFE COMMITTEE, INC. (Sept. 25, 2017), http://www.nrlc.org/uploads/ fetalpain/KeyPointsOnPCUPA.pdf.
13
AM. UNITED FOR LIFE, DEFENDING LIFE 2012: BUILDING A CULTURE OF
LIFE, EXPOSING AND CONFRONTING THE ABORTION INDUSTRY 235 (2012),
http://www.aul.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/model-womens-health-defenseact.pdf [hereinafter DEFENDING LIFE 2012] (publishing the Women’s Health Defense Acts as “AUL Model Legislation”).
14
Id.
15
See, e.g., Matt Hadro, Marist Poll: 6 in 10 Americans Support a 20-Week
Abortion Ban, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2017/jan/24/marist-poll-6-in-10-americans-favor-20-week-aborti/; Eugene
Scott, Most GOP Lawmakers Support Banning Late-Term Abortions, and So Do
a Lot of Women, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/the-fix/wp/2017/10/04/most-gop-lawmakers-support-banning-late-termabortions-and-so-do-a-lot-of-women/?utm_term=.00bd572721a8.
16
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
TO
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contraception.17 But over the next several decades, as efforts to reform or repeal abortion laws took hold, an organized pro-life movement took shape.18 These pro-life groups took no official position
on birth control.19 Although NRLC received support from the Catholic Church, pro-life groups emphasized secular arguments, often
pointing to right-to-life language in the Declaration of Independence.20 The movement also had a constitutional agenda.21 Pro-life
attorneys argued that protection for the unborn child could be found
in the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment.22
Roe v. Wade rejected what abortion foes viewed as many of their
strongest arguments. First, the Court addressed the question of fetal
personhood.23 Roe treated this mostly as a textual matter, focusing
on how the word “person” was used throughout the Constitution.24
Since the text seemed to apply the term only postnatally, the Court
concluded that the fetus could not be a person within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment.25 Next, the Court considered whether
the government had a compelling interest in protecting life from the
moment of conception.26 Here, the Court focused on the divergence
of religious, medical, and ideological opinions as to when life begins.27 If experts could not agree on when life begins, as the Court
reasoned, the state could not impose one conclusive view of the subject on everyone else.28

17

See, e.g., DANIEL K. WILLIAMS, DEFENDERS OF THE UNBORN 3–12 (2016).
On the emergence of the pro-life movement, see, for example, id.; MARY
ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE: THE LOST HISTORY OF THE ABORTION DEBATE 38–51
(2015) [hereinafter ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE].
19
See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 17, at 58–62, 91–95.
20
See, e.g., id. at 90–119; ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE, supra note 18, at 39–40.
21
On the pro-life movement’s constitutional agenda in the period, see Mary
Ziegler, Originalism Talk: A Legal History, 2014 BYU L. REV. 869, 870–71,
884 (2014).
22
See, e.g., id. at 884.
23
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156–157 (1973).
24
See id. at 157–58.
25
See id. at 158.
26
See id. at 159.
27
See id. at 160–62.
28
See id. at 162.
18
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Roe did not immediately discourage pro-lifers from prioritizing
a constitutional right to life.29 Indeed, within months of the Supreme
Court’s decision, several members of Congress put forth constitutional proposals that would undo Roe.30 Two such examples of constitutional proposals are the amendment proposed by Representative
Lawrence Hogan (R-MD) that would protect a right to life “from the
moment of conception,”31 and the alternative amendment proposed
by Senator James Buckley (Conservative-NY), which stated: “With
respect to the right to life, the word ‘person’ . . . applies to all human
beings, including their unborn offspring at every stage of their biological development.” 32 However, from the very beginning of abortion opposition, there has been a dispute among pro-life attorneys
who wanted to chip away at Roe incrementally by emphasizing laws
that would only limit access to abortion, and pro-life lawmakers who
fought for an absolute ban of abortion by passing a constitutional
amendmentt.33
Pro-life lawyers experimented with different litigation techniques. Rather than asking the Court to recognize a fundamental
right to life, pro-life lawyers argued that courts could uphold some
abortion regulations without overruling Roe. 34 In Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,35 for example, AUL
argued that Roe permitted informed-consent restrictions.36 Danforth
seemingly vindicated AUL’s new approach.37 Although the Court
struck down several parts of the challenged Missouri law, the Court
upheld an informed-consent regulation and explained that “[t]he decision to abort, indeed, is an important, and often a stressful one, and

29

See, e.g., ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE, supra note 18, at 38–45.
See NAT’L COMMITTEE FOR A HUMAN LIFE AMEND., HUMAN LIFE AMENDMENT: MAJOR TEXTS (2004), https://www.humanlifeaction.org/sites/default/files/
HLAmajortexts.pdf.
31
Id. at 3.
32
Id. at 1.
33
See, e.g., ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE, supra note 18, at 77–78.
34
See Motion and Brief, Amicus Curiae of Dr. Eugene Diamond and Americans United for Life, Inc. at 43–52, in Support of Appellees in 74-1151 and Appellants in 74-1419 at 43–52, Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52 (1976) (Nos. 74-1151, 74-1419) [hereinafter AUL Brief].
35
428 U.S. 52 (1976).
36
AUL Brief, supra note 34, at 86–88.
37
See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 65–67.
30
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it is desirable and imperative that it be made with full knowledge of
its nature and consequences.”38
Following Danforth, the pro-life movement had reason to expand its incremental approach beyond the courts. The same year that
the Court issued a decision in Danforth, Congress passed the Hyde
Amendment, a rider to an appropriations bill that outlawed Medicaid
reimbursement for abortion. 39 When it passed, the Hyde Amendment struck many in the pro-life movement as an unprecedented
success. As early as 1974, Ray White, the new executive director of
NRLC, insisted that cutting federal funding for abortion would stop
270,000 abortions a year.40 The amendment seemed even more strategically significant after the Supreme Court issued a series of decisions on abortion funding, including Maher v. Roe41 and Harris v.
McRae.42
Maher upheld a Connecticut statute outlawing most Medicaid
funding for abortions by applying the constitutional “undue burden”
standard.43 “[W]e have held that a requirement for a lawful abortion
‘is not unconstitutional unless it unduly burdens the right to seek an
abortion,’” the Maher court stated.44 But a law could not be unduly
burdensome if it “place[d] no obstacles—absolute or otherwise—in
the pregnant woman’s path to an abortion.”45 Because the government did not create poverty, Maher concluded that there was no

38

Id. at 67.
On the passage of the Hyde Amendment and its significance, see NICOLE
MELLOW, THE STATE OF DISUNION 138–145 (2008); LAURENCE TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 153 (1992).
40
On White’s estimate, see Ray White, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Right to Life
Comm., to Bd. of Dir., Nat’l Right to Life Comm. (Nov. 1974) (The American
Citizens Concerned for Life Papers, Box 8, 1974 NRLC Folder 1). For more on
the movement’s interest in funding, see Nat’l Right to Life Comm., Senate Votes
to Prohibit Federal Funding for Abortion (Oct. 1974) (The American Citizens
Concerned for Life Papers, Box 8, 1974 NRLC Folder 1). On the relative abortion
rates of Medicaid-eligible and Medicaid-ineligible women, see Jacqueline Darroch Forest, Christopher Tietze & Ellen Sullivan, Abortion in the United States,
1976–1977, 10 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 270, 274–75 (1978).
41
432 U.S. 453 (1977).
42
448 U.S. 297, 300–01 (1980).
43
Maher, 432 U.S. at 473–74.
44
Id. at 473 (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976)).
45
Id. at 474.
39
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constitutional violation.46 McRae upheld the federal Hyde Amendment for similar reasons.47
Maher and McRae strengthened the pro-life interest in an alternative to the constitutional approach, one that would allow abortion
foes to slowly chip away at legal abortion and reduce abortion
rates.48 Incrementalism, as its proponents called it, gained support
because the constitutional strategy had stalled.49 Between 1974 and
1977, no fetal-personhood amendment received a vote.50
Following the election of President Ronald Reagan, who
strongly opposed abortion, abortion foes controlled Congress and
the White House and it seemed possible that a constitutional amendment would pass.51 Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) introduced the socalled Human Life Bill in January 1981.52 The federal statute that
Helms proposed would have gutted abortion rights by defining the
fetus as a person from the moment of conception. 53 At the same
time, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) proposed a constitutional amendment that would allow the states and Congress to ban abortion.54
Thus, by the summer of 1981, Congress had two clear paths to undermining Roe.55
Internal divisions soon doomed both the Hatch Amendment and
the Human Life Bill. Absolutists denounced the Hatch Amendment
as a betrayal of the movement’s principles, a proposal that would
not recognize a right to life and would allow Congress to claim to
be pro-life without outlawing a single abortion. 56 Pragmatists, in
contrast, thought that the Human Life Bill and other more ambitious
46

Id. at 469.
McRae, 448 U.S. at 315.
48
On pro-life incrementalism, see ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE, supra note 18, at
58–61.
49
See id. at 59
50
Id. at 51.
51
See id. at 83.
52
See, e.g., Joan Beck, Pro-Life Groups Turn to Congress on Abortion, CHI.
TRIB., Jan. 23, 1981, at B2; see also ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE, supra note 18, at 84.
53
See, e.g., Beck, supra note 52.
54
On the Hatch Amendment, see ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE, supra note 18 at 86–
88; Anti-Abortion Group Backs Hatch Proposal, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13,
1981), https://www.nytimes.com/1981/12/13/us/anti-abortion-group-backshatch-proposal.html.
55
See ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE, supra note 18, at 86–88.
56
Id.
47
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proposals would not pass or would be struck down in the courts.57
Following the failure of Hatch’s and Helms’ proposals, Hatch and
his allies made a last-ditch attempt to pass an amendment.58 Hatch
joined Senator Thomas Eagleton (D-MO) in proposing a modified
version of Hatch’s original Amendment, which was named the
“Hatch-Eagleton Amendment” and was slated for a full Senate vote
in June 1983.59 Behind the scenes, almost everyone had given up,
and with reason: the Senate defeated the Hatch-Eagleton Amendment by a vote of 49 to 50.60
The failure of the Hatch-Eagleton Amendment, together with the
success of the Hyde Amendment, strengthened the hand of pro-life
incrementalists. Incrementalism prioritized limits on access to abortion.61 By winning concrete victories, the pro-life movement hoped
to energize its members, convince donors to back the movement,
and persuade politicians that pro-life voters could swing some elections.62 Incrementalism, its proponents hoped, would set the stage
for overruling Roe.63 Convincing the Court to uphold some abortion
regulations would shake the foundation of abortion rights, making
abortion doctrine seem incoherent and ultimately convincing the
Justices that there was nothing left of Roe to uphold.64 Finally, incrementalism could lower the abortion rate before a more complete
constitutional solution could be put in place.65
As this Article shows, a new wave of antiabortion legislation reflects a different take on pro-life incrementalism, which was centered on the recognition of new justifications for regulating abortion.
This Part canvasses some of the most important examples of new
antiabortion legislation, exploring why and how abortion foes have
proposed new legislative rationales for abortion restrictions or expanded on existing ones.
In 2016, in Whole Woman’s Health, the Supreme Court devastated abortion opponents who expected a decision equating the
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

See, e.g., id.
See id. at 88–89.
See id.
See id. at 89.
See id. at 88–89.
See id. at 90.
See id. at 88.
See id.
See id. at 85.
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undue burden standard with rational basis review. 66 However,
Whole Woman’s Health did little to change the kind of legislation
pro-lifers aggressively backed. This Part focuses on new legislative
interests shaping major legal campaigns pursued by the antiabortion
movement.
B. Fetal Pain, Fetal Dignity, and Other Interests
NRLC first pointed to fetal pain as a reason for legislative intervention during debate about the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban
Act,67 a law outlawing dilation and extraction abortions (“D&X”), a
procedure whereby a provider removes a fetus intact.68 NRLC relied
on the testimony of Dr. Kanwaljeet Anand, suggesting that “[m]ultiple lines of scientific evidence converge to support the conclusion
that the fetus can experience pain from 20 weeks of gestation.”69
Anand’s testimony initially served NRLC’s claim that partial-birth
abortion—which was often performed later in pregnancy—should
be banned as a way of preventing fetal pain. 70 In 2011, NRLC
started promoting the Pain-Capable Unborn Child Act, a twentyweek abortion ban, as an independent piece of legislation. 71 Nebraska and Kansas became the first and second states, respectively,
to pass such a law, and others quickly followed.72
66

See Mary Ziegler, Liberty and the Politics of Balance: The Undue burden
Test After Casey/Hellerstedt, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 421, 454 (2017) [hereinafter Ziegler, Liberty and the Politics of Balance].
67
S. Res. 3, 108th Cong., 117 Stat. 1201 (2003).
68
See, e.g., Expert Report of Kanwaljeet S. Anand, M.B.B.S., D.Phil., Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805 (D. Neb. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Carhart v.
Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (No.
4:03CV3385),
http://www.nrlc.org/uploads/fetalpain/AnandPainReport.pdf
[hereinafter Expert Report]; Letter from Douglas Johnson, Legislative Dir., Nat’l.
Right to Life Comm., to Sci. and Med. Editors/Reporters (Jan. 2, 1996),
http://www.nrlc.org/uploads/fetalpain/Anesthesia%20Myth%20Memo.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Douglas Johnson].
69
Expert Report, supra note 68, at 5.
70
See id.
71
On the original push for such legislation, see Press Release, Nat’l. Right to
Life Comm., Carhart Move Demonstrates Need for Protective Legislation (Nov.
18, 2010), http://www.nrlc.org/communications/releases/2010/release111810
[hereinafter Carhart].
72
H.B. 2218, 2011 Sess. (Kan. 2011) (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 656724 (2012). On the Kansas law, see Press Release, Nat’l. Right to Life Comm.,
Brownback Signs Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act (Apr. 12, 2011),
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NRLC and AUL have also promoted a model law outlawing dilation and evacuation abortions (“D&E”), a procedure whereby a
provider removes a fetus in several parts.73 Starting in 2015, NRLC
began pushing laws that banned most D&Es.74 Eight states passed a
version of this model law, although courts have enjoined enforcement of most of them.75 Pro-life groups advocate for these laws by
pointing to governmental interests beyond the protection of fetal
life.76 NRLC claims that bans on D&E prevent fetal pain,77 but also
defends these laws by pointing to a “separate and independent compelling interest in fostering respect for life” or “protecting the integrity of the medical profession with passage of this law.”78
AUL and NRLC invoked similar legislative interests in defending a new wave of laws governing the disposal of fetal remains. In
2016 alone, nine states passed laws like Texas’ SB8, which requires
health-care facilities to bury or cremate fetal or embryonic remains.79 An earlier generation of similar laws has been in place for
decades, but the new laws more clearly rely on a governmental
http://www.nrlc.org/communications/releases/2011/release041211 [hereinafter
Brownback]. For other states that passed such a law see, for example, ALA. CODE
§ 26-23B (2017); IDAHO CODE § 18-505 (2018); OKLA. STAT. 63 § 1-745.5
(2017).
73
OBOS Abortion Contributors, Dilation and Evacuation Abortion, OURBODIESOURSELVES (Apr. 2, 2014), https://www.ourbodiesourselves.org/ bookexcerpts/health-article/dilation-and-evacuation-abortion/.
74
See NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE COMM., DISMEMBERMENT ABORTION BANS 1
(2018), http://www.nrlc.org/uploads/stateleg/StateLawsDismembermentAbort
ionBans.pdf.
75
See id. at 2.
76
NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE COMM., TALKING POINTS: UNBORN CHILD PROTECTION FROM DISMEMBERMENT ABORTION ACT 4 (2015), https://www.nrlc .org/uploads/stateleg/DismembermentFAQJan15.pdf [hereinafter TALKING POINTS].
77
See id. at 2.
78
Id. at 4.
79
S.B. 8, 2017 Leg., 85th Sess. (Tex. 2017). On the spread of these laws, see,
for example, Brian Fraga, Pro-Life Movement Looks to Build in 2016, NAT. CATH.
REG. (Jan. 4, 2016), http://www.ncregister.com/site/article/pro-life-movementlooks-to-build-in-2016; Rebecca Grant, The Latest Anti-Abortion Trend? Mandatory Funerals for Fetuses, NATION (Oct. 11, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/the-latest-anti-abortion-trend-mandatory-funerals-for-fetuses;
Anna Paprocki, Why the Abortion Industry Wants to Ban Funerals for Miscarried
Babies, FEDERALIST (Nov. 11, 2016), http://thefederalist.com/2016/11/14/abortion-industry-wants-ban-funerals-miscarried-babies/.
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interest in fetal dignity.80 In 2015, AUL began promoting a model
law of this kind, the Unborn Infants’ Dignity Act (“UIDA”).81 The
UIDA would require women to be given a choice to bury or cremate
fetuses that have reached a certain stage of development provided
that a miscarriage or abortion takes place at a health-care institution.82 Women who do not choose to make these arrangements must
consent to whatever disposition a healthcare provider elects.83
The rationale for the UIDA goes beyond the conventional interest in protecting fetal life. Like fetal-pain laws, the UIDA does nothing (at least in theory) to prevent abortion.84 Instead, as Anna Paprocki of AUL has explained, those passing the law claim an interest
not in restricting abortion but in ensuring that “human beings [are]
treated with dignity and respect at death.”85
AUL and NRLC have also refined arguments involving laws designed to protect women. As Part II shows, the protection of women
represented one of the first alternative governmental purposes championed by pro-lifers. At first, abortion foes focused primarily on the
psychological harm that women could face. 86 More recently, targeted regulation of abortion providers (“TRAP laws”), like the law
struck down by the Court in Whole Woman’s Health, have zeroed in
on purported threats to women’s physical health.87 The new womanprotective laws have a different focus, claiming to protect women
from domestic violence or medical abortion, a method using pills
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rather than surgical techniques to end pregnancy. 88 For example,
AUL model legislation would make it a serious crime to coerce anyone to have an abortion and would require abortion clinics to post
signs stating that no one can be forced into an abortion.89 The law
further identifies parties who must report any suspected coerced
abortion, mandates that physicians privately counsel women about
coerced abortion, and delay performing an abortion when coercion
is reasonably suspected.90 AUL also introduced laws requiring mandatory counseling for any woman seeking medical abortion91 and
strict regulations on the issuance and use of “abortion-inducing
drugs.” 92 The group claims that “medical evidence demonstrates
that the current FDA-approved protocol carries significant risks and
administering the drugs outside the current FDA protocol places
women at even greater risk.”93
Why have abortion foes invested so much in laws advancing interests beyond protecting fetal life? To be sure, as the Article shows
in Part II, the answer is partly political. Starting in the late 1980s,
when a clinic-blockade movement exploded onto the political scene,
pro-life leaders argued that the public too often viewed abortion opponents as anti-woman extremists.94 By focusing on laws that claim
to help women, pro-lifers hope to challenge this negative image.95
One might also argue that abortion foes have little choice but to focus on governmental interests beyond the protection of fetal life.
88
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After all, the Roe Court rejected the argument that the government
had a compelling interest in protecting life from the moment of conception.96 Pro-lifers might have every reason to repackage interests
tied to fetal life as an interest in fetal dignity or fetal suffering.
But a close look at the new legislation that pro-lifers have backed
shows that identifying new legislative interests has broader strategic
importance. First, abortion foes hope to dislodge viability as the
point at which states can fully ban abortion.97 Under both Roe and
Casey, the government cannot outlaw abortion outright until a fetus
reaches viability: the point at which an unborn child can survive outside the womb. 98 By playing to public discomfort with late term
abortions, NRLC and AUL hope to inch closer to the point at which
lawmakers can outlaw abortion.99 As important, the identification of
new governmental interests would allow the Court to radically undercut the protections created by Roe and Casey without explicitly
overruling either one.100 As Mary Spaulding Balch of NRLC explains: “Recognizing a compelling state interest in the unborn child
who is capable of experiencing pain would not require the Court to
overturn, but only to supplement, its prior recognition of a compelling state interest in the unborn child after viability.”101 The capacity
to feel pain, as Spaulding Balch reasons, can serve as a back-door
strategy for establishing fetal personhood.102 She argues,
It is critically important to understand that the interest asserted here is not just one in diminishing or
eliminating unborn children’s pain. Rather, it is that
the fact of the unborn child’s having the capacity to
experience pain is a significant developmental milepost making the unborn child at that point
96
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sufficiently akin to an infant or older child to trigger
a compelling state interest.103
Moreover, if the evidence supporting fetal pain at twenty weeks
is uncertain, Spaulding Balch argues that lawmakers are still free to
act.104 “States may make judgments based on substantial medical
evidence even when there is medical dispute,” Spaulding Balch emphasizes.105 NRLC has offered a similar justification for promoting
a new compelling interest in the context of dismemberment laws.106
According to an NRLC factsheet,
The states enacting the Unborn Child Protection
from Dismemberment Abortion Act are not asking
the Supreme Court to overturn or replace the 1973
Roe v. Wade holding that the state’s interest in unborn human life becomes “compelling” at viability.
Rather, the states are applying the interest the Court
recognized in the 2007 Gonzales case, that states
have a separate and independent compelling interest
in fostering respect for life by protecting the unborn
child from death by dismemberment abortion.107
By convincing the Court to recognize abstract, broad compelling
governmental interests, antiabortion attorneys can justify far more
sweeping regulations without asking the Court to recognize fetal
personhood or repudiate Roe or Casey. Pro-life attorneys can also
advocate for laws that do not seem to advance the state’s interest in
protecting life articulated in Casey, while creating an obstacle in the
path of a woman seeking abortion. If the Court is willing to recognize interests in fetal dignity, preventing abortion coercion, or eliminating fetal suffering, pro-life attorneys can defend a far wider array
of restrictions. These governmental interests could open the door for
states to extensively restrict abortion earlier in pregnancy.
Where does the new purpose-centered incrementalism come
from, and how, if at all, has it shaped the Supreme Court’s abortion
103
104
105
106
107
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jurisprudence? Part II begins to develop an answer to these questions
by tracing the roots of some of the incoherence plaguing the Court’s
abortion doctrine: a shifting willingness to recognize and redefine
interests beyond the protection of fetal life.
II. OTHER PURPOSES: FROM DANFORTH TO CASEY
Convinced that the Supreme Court would not recognize a right
to life in the near future, pro-life incrementalists began searching for
alternative justifications for regulating abortion. Part II begins by
exploring the first effort of this kind in the leadup to Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, where abortion foes
urged the Court to recognize an interest in protecting the husbandwife or parent-child relationship.108 Danforth picked up on a different rationale for regulating abortion, one that is centered on the consequences of decisional autonomy for women.109
Part II next shows that after the Court upheld a mandated-counseling law, abortion foes began stressing the importance of the government’s interest in protecting women’s health. Although the Supreme Court rejected this argument in 1983,110 the majority, which
previously supported strong abortion rights, shrank as Presidents
Reagan and George H.W. Bush nominated new members to the
Court. Meanwhile, abortion opponents continued championing alternative governmental interests. 111 Together, Danforth, Akron I,
and Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists112 sent a somewhat confusing message about the identification of new governmental interests. The Court suggested, but never
formally held, that the government could not only regulate unsafe
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procedures but could also protect women from unwise decisions.113
At the same time, the Court sent conflicting signals about whether
and to what degree the government had to show that an informedconsent law improved women’s decision-making.114
The incoherence of the Court’s jurisprudence only grew following the decision of Thornburgh.115 After Thornburgh, the pro-life
movement once again started emphasizing a compelling interest in
protecting fetal life, believing that the Court would soon overrule
Roe.116 The Court’s decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services only reinforced interest in this strategy. 117 However, some
abortion opponents began stressing the political costs of so exclusively stressing an interest in fetal life. Members of AUL specifically insisted that this tactic portrayed the pro-life movement as antiwoman.118 These activists urged their colleagues to stress an interest
in protecting women.119 This Part shows that Casey reflected this reemerging effort to carve out a governmental interest in protecting
women. The Casey decision reinvigorated efforts to identify multiple governmental interests that support abortion restrictions. If the
Court was reluctant to overrule Roe directly, as pro-lifers concluded,
it might be possible to erode abortion rights by convincing the Court
to recognize more and more reasons that the government could regulate abortion.120
Casey also further muddied the Court’s treatment of the government’s interest in fetal life. Was the government limited to an interest in preventing fetal killing? Or did Casey also recognize related,
but less tangible, interests like respect for fetal life? Casey had certainly held that the government’s interest in protecting fetal life applied throughout pregnancy, but had the Court also suggested that
an interest in protecting life was weightier than Roe suggested?121
Without answering these questions (or overruling earlier precedents
113
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that treated them differently), Casey added another layer of inconsistency to the Court’s abortion jurisprudence.122
A. After Roe: Reasons for Restricting Abortion
The Court’s decision in Roe dashed the hopes of those who had
believed that the justices would recognize a compelling governmental interest in protecting fetal life. 123 Pro-life groups initially responded by avoiding the courts, instead championing a constitutional amendment that would ban abortion and force the Court to
uphold laws criminalizing the procedure.124 At the same time, however, antiabortion attorneys recognized that championing an interest
in protecting fetal life might not be enough to advance the movement’s cause in Congress or the courts.125
Pro-lifers speculated that alternative justifications for banning
abortion might appeal to a broader audience.126 In the 1970s, to explore this possibility, pro-lifers argued that Congress and the states
had a compelling interest in banning abortion to protect the nuclear
family from the forces that threatened it.127 Dennis Horan, a pro
bono attorney for the AUL, maintained that Roe “provided one more
wedge to separate, undermine and ultimately destroy the nuclear
family.”128 Horan argued that Roe awarded unfair power to pregnant
women, threatening their relationships with their husbands and undermining fathers’ unions with their children. 129 Joseph Witherspoon, a University of Texas professor, made a similar argument.
Witherspoon insisted that Roe ran counter to both the Thirteenth and
122
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Fourteenth Amendments.130 As Witherspoon saw it, the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments not only recognized an unborn child’s
right to life but also men’s fundamental rights to have a paternal
relationship with their unborn children.131 The government, Witherspoon suggested, had a compelling interest in protecting men’s
rights as husbands and fathers.132
When the abortion issue returned to the Supreme Court, antiabortion attorneys hoped that the Court might pave the way for new
regulations by recognizing a new governmental interest. 133 AUL
took on this strategy in its amicus brief in Danforth, a case involving
a multi-part Missouri restriction. 134 AUL repeated familiar arguments that the Constitution recognized a fundamental right to life
and attacked Roe as constitutionally unsound.135
However, the group also contended that the Missouri statute was
constitutional even under Roe because that decision had identified a
number of interests that could justify abortion regulations.136 AUL
reasoned that,
Although in the Roe decision this Court explicitly
mentioned only three state interests, i.e., maternal
health, medical standards, and prenatal life, which
could justify regulating the right of privacy in the
context of the abortion decision, there are persuasive
reasons to believe that those interests mentioned
were never envisaged as exclusive.137
In addition to the government’s interest in protecting fetal life,
AUL stressed that the government had a compelling interest in protecting women’s health.138 AUL also advocated for a compelling
state interest in protecting the family.139 “The narrow issue, then,”
130
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AUL asserted, “is whether allowing a wife to make a unilateral decision of the magnitude of the abortion decision could be destructive
of the family entity.”140
AUL also hoped that the Court would radically broaden alreadyrecognized governmental interests. For example, the organization
stressed the importance of protecting women’s health when defending an informed-consent regulation. 141 AUL argued that Roe had
“enumerated some of the factors, medical and psychological, concerning which the woman and her physician would necessarily consider in consultation prior to making the abortion decision.”142 If
Roe had recognized that the abortion decision was “a stressful one
at best,” then the Court should recognize a compelling interest in
women’s mental health and let stand the mandatory-consent provision.143
Although Danforth struck down most of Missouri’s law, the
Court’s decision did suggest that pro-lifers could make incremental
progress by championing new governmental interests in restricting
abortion and by expanding existing ones.144 The Court reasoned that
if the government could not veto a woman’s abortion decision, Missouri could not delegate that power to a woman’s spouse.145 Moreover, the Court suggested that if a man and woman could not agree,
the woman was more directly impacted by pregnancy and should
have the ultimate say about abortion.146 Nevertheless, as pro-lifers
noted, the Court spoke favorably of the “deep and proper concern
and interest that a devoted and protective husband has in his wife’s
pregnancy and in the growth and development of the fetus she is
carrying.”147 Perhaps the problem with Missouri’s law was that it
was not narrowly tailored—allowing a man a complete veto—rather
than requiring notification.
Danforth upheld the mandatory-consent provision, reinforcing
pro-lifers’ interest in redefining the government’s interest in
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protecting women’s health.148 Those challenging the Missouri law
had argued that it singled out abortion, requiring written consent for
no other surgical procedures, and likely had a chilling effect on
women, sending the message that abortion was wrong.149 The Court
disagreed, citing the government’s interest in protecting women’s
health.150 As Justice Harry Blackmun explained,
The decision to abort, indeed, is an important, and
often a stressful one, and it is desirable and imperative that it be made with full knowledge of its nature
and consequences. The woman is the one primarily
concerned, and her awareness of the decision and its
significance may be assured, constitutionally, by the
State to the extent of requiring her prior written consent.151
While Danforth did not recognize new governmental justifications
for restricting abortion, the Court did suggest that the interest in protecting women’s health might be broader than many had imagined.152 Whereas the Roe Court focused on the threat of physical
complications following an abortion, Danforth suggested that the
government might have a compelling interest in safeguarding
women’s mental health, and abortion opponents hoped to capitalize
on this.153
B. Redefining Women’s Health
In the aftermath of Danforth, abortion foes invested more in the
identification or expansion of governmental interests in restricting
abortion. The pro-life movement did so partly by promoting a model
antiabortion law, first adopted in Akron, Ohio as Ordinance No.
160-1978, that showcased the effort to identify new justifications for
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regulating abortion. 154 The City of Akron ordinance built on
Danforth. For example, the law included a narrower parental-involvement requirement and a broader informed-consent provision
that demanded that women hear controversial information, including disputed statements about the risks of abortion.155
When the Supreme Court decided to hear a constitutional challenge to the City of Akron ordinance, pro-life attorneys went beyond
the strategy laid out in Danforth, arguing that any laws that did not
have the purpose of limiting access to abortion should not be subject
to strict judicial scrutiny.156 If a law had a different purpose, such as
helping women, then a law was constitutional in “the first three
months of pregnancy so long as such regulation does not ‘unduly
burden’ a woman’s constitutionally-protected right to have an abortion.”157
Akron I picked up on language in some of the Court’s earlier
abortion opinions, including Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti I) and Maher.158 Bellotti I, a case about minors and abortion, reinforced the
Court’s finding in Danforth that an abortion regulation “is not unconstitutional unless it unduly burdens the right to seek an abortion.”159 However, in Bellotti I and Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II), the
Court acknowledged that cases involving minors’ rights were different—parents had constitutional rights that could come into play,
and the government could more readily justify actions taken to protect minors from the consequences of unwise decisions.160 Neither
Bellotti I nor Bellotti II spelled out whether a similar analysis would
apply to adults’ abortion rights.161 Maher, an abortion funding case,
expanded on the idea of an unconstitutional undue burden.162 Maher
154
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held that the abortion right protected women only from “unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy.”163 By extension, as the Court explained, the
right “implies no limitation on the authority of a State to make a
value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement
that judgment by the allocation of public funds.”164
Relying upon these precedents, the City of Akron argued that
some kind of undue burden analysis should apply to every abortion
case, not just those involving abortion funding or minors.165 If the
Court applied the undue burden analysis, then the justices would
“balance the woman’s interest against the nature of the state’s interference in exercising that right.”166 The City of Akron illustrated
how this constitutional approach would work. When defending its
informed-consent provision, the City stressed that the ordinance was
not designed to obstruct abortion access but was “designed to protect
the woman and ensure that her consent will be truly informed.”167
The City argued that as a result, the Court should balance women’s
interest in abortion against the government’s proper interest in protecting women.168
In an amicus brief on behalf of Feminists for Life, AUL put a
similar emphasis on new governmental interests in restricting abortion. 169 As AUL reasoned, the City of Akron’s informed-consent
regulation was not designed to limit access to abortion.170 Instead,
AUL emphasized that the law was “intended to insure the integrity
of the woman’s decision-making process prior to abortion.” 171 If
abortion hurt women, as AUL reasoned, then the state had a duty
and compelling interest in regulating abortion.172 “In addition to enabling the woman to make a meaningful choice, information on fetal
163
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development may protect her from the trauma which she may later
experience because of an improvident and uninformed decision in
this regard,” AUL stressed.173
Although a majority rejected the arguments made by the City of
Akron and AUL, dissenters in Akron I suggested that the movement
could make progress by identifying new governmental justifications
for regulating abortion. While reiterating that the government had
an interest in protecting women’s mental health, the Court reined in
states’ power to pass informed-consent regulations.174 The Court repeated that “certain regulations that have no significant impact on
the woman’s exercise of her right may be permissible where justified by important state health objectives.” 175 Nevertheless, the
Court suggested that states could not force women to consume inaccurate information designed to dissuade them from choosing abortion. 176 When it came to the City of Akron ordinance, the Court
stressed that “much of the information required is designed not to
inform the woman’s consent but rather to persuade her to withhold
it altogether.”177
In some ways, Akron I seemed hard to reconcile with Danforth.
In theory, Akron I recognized the same governmental interest identified by Danforth. However, the Court in Akron I expressed considerable skepticism about whether the government had a real interest
in protecting women’s mental health.178 Akron I framed the difference between the ordinance discussed in the case and the Missouri
statute discussed in Danforth as one involving the type of information detailed in the law.179 As Akron I described it, the City of
Akron required physicians to speculate or opine on when life began.180 Likewise, the ordinance at issue in Akron I set out a parade
of horribles that was somewhat less than accurate.181
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However, the differences between the laws—and the governmental interests supporting them—were less pronounced than the
Court suggested. Arguably, the law in Danforth was designed to discourage some women from terminating their pregnancies.182 Moreover, as in Akron I, Danforth arguably involved “intrusion upon the
discretion of the pregnant woman’s physician.”183 The Court sent
conflicting messages about whether the government could legitimately act to protect women’s mental health without patronizing
and insulting them.
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, President Reagan’s first Supreme
Court nominee, wrote a dissent that sent yet another signal about the
recognition of new governmental interests in regulating abortion.184
O’Connor stressed that the Court had already expanded the government’s interest in protecting women’s health, but she went a step
further: she also asserted that whatever governmental interests justified abortion regulations applied throughout pregnancy, not just in
later trimesters.185
Justice O’Connor also adopted a version of the undue burden
standard proposed by the City of Akron and AUL.186 The City of
Akron and AUL had focused partly on the purpose of a law, suggesting that the government should have more latitude to regulate
abortion when the law was not intended to obstruct abortion access. 187 O’Connor, by contrast, emphasized the probable effect of an
abortion restriction.188 “The abortion cases demonstrate that an ‘undue burden’ has been found for the most part in situations involving
absolute obstacles or severe limitations on the abortion decision,”
O’Connor wrote.189 She reasoned that the Court had mostly struck
down laws that completely eliminated abortion access or criminalized the procedure altogether.190
182
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C. The Aftermath of Akron I
Although Justice O’Connor dissented from the majority, her
opinion did provide a new touchstone for pro-life incrementalists
seeking to forge a post-Roe strategy.191 However, because O’Connor did not focus on the purpose (beneficial or otherwise) of abortion regulations, groups like AUL temporarily emphasized different
strategies.192 One involved the shifting date of viability.193 O’Connor had stressed that as medical technology evolved, viability would
move earlier and earlier in pregnancy.194 In 1984, at a conference on
how to build on O’Connor’s dissent, AUL and its allies agreed that
the “most advantageous starting point” for a new strategy was “a
critical examination of Roe’s reliance on the concept of viability.”195
AUL asserted that by shaping the Court’s understanding of viability, abortion opponents could argue “the state’s interest in preserving that life must begin at a much earlier stage of development.”196 AUL conferees did discuss the government’s interest in
protecting women’s health.197 But rather than explaining ways to
convince the Court to define health more broadly, conferees zeroed
in on ways to narrow the supposed health-based justifications for
abortion, including the benefits to women’s health.198
The Supreme Court’s next abortion case, Thornburgh, did nothing to change antiabortion attorneys’ shift away from purpose arguments.199 Thornburgh involved a model Pennsylvania law that included familiar provisions, such as an informed-consent measure,
and viability-based restrictions. 200 Although Thornburgh struck
down the disputed law, the majority in favor of abortion rights
191
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shrank to five.201 Chief Justice Warren Burger, one of the justices
who had joined the original majority in Roe, pointed to Akron I and
Thornburgh as evidence that abortion jurisprudence had become
hopelessly muddled.202 Chief Justice Burger also suggested that the
time might have come to reexamine Roe.203 Justice Byron White
penned a dissent insisting that the Court should “recognize that Roe
v. Wade departs from a proper understanding of the Constitution and
overrule it.”204
Thornburgh made it seem possible that one new justice could
become the deciding vote to overrule Roe. It would not take long for
the Court’s membership to change. In the summer of 1987, Justice
Lewis F. Powell announced his retirement from the Court, and President Reagan nominated Judge Robert Bork of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to replace
him.205 Bork’s nomination failed, becoming one of the most controversial confirmation fights in history and setting the stage for the
politicization of later nominees .206 Nevertheless, President Reagan
quickly found a replacement, choosing Judge Anthony Kennedy of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.207 Justice
Kennedy’s nomination sailed through Congress, and abortion foes
201
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celebrated.208 “[T]he general assumption is that Kennedy will provide the swing vote determining whether the Court may begin to
‘chip away’ at the 1973 Roe v. Wade decision,” argued National
Right to Life News, NRLC’s flagship newsletter.209
In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,210 a reconstituted
Court seemed ready to fulfill the prediction made by National Right
to Life News.211 The Webster Court agreed to hear a challenge to
three parts of a Missouri abortion law: (1) a preamble stating that
life begins at conception; (2) a prohibition on the use of public funding, counseling, or facilities for abortion; and (3) a statutory definition of viability.212 Pro-life groups focused not on promoting different governmental interests but on convincing the Court to apply a
forgiving standard of review to abortion regulations.213 In an amicus
brief, for example, NRLC argued that the proper standard of review
was rational basis—a standard that virtually any abortion regulation
would survive.214 NRLC insisted that if the Court did not adopt a
suitably relaxed standard of scrutiny, abortion doctrine would continue to be contradictory and confusing.215
Webster energized those who hoped that the Court would soon
overrule Roe outright. The Court upheld all of the challenged provisions, but the most telling part of the opinion came in the plurality’s
discussion of a viability-related measure. 216 The Missouri law required that after the twentieth week of pregnancy, physicians should
perform certain tests to ensure that a fetus was not viable. 217 As
208
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those challenging the law recognized, the provision was in tension
with Roe, creating a presumption of viability in the second, rather
than third, trimester.218 But as the plurality saw it, any problem revealed by the Missouri law exposed flaws in the Roe decision, not
the Missouri law.219 Webster suggested that there was no constitutional foundation for Roe’s trimester framework.220 Moreover, the
plurality reasoned that there was no reason that the government’s
interest in protecting life should come into existence only in the third
trimester.221 While Webster did not overrule Roe, Justice Antonin
Scalia demanded explicit reconsideration of the decision, and the
stage seemed set for a more direct confrontation.222
Following Webster, abortion opponents picked up on another
strategy outlined by AUL during the 1984 conference.223 As conferees argued, Roe rested on the conclusion that women’s interest in
health outweighed the government’s interest in protecting fetal
life.224 Pro-life attorneys believed that if the Court’s composition
changed, “the ‘health claim’ based solely on the psychological discomfort . . . [became] markedly vulnerable.”225 As the Court became
more convinced by pro-life claims about fetal personhood, the conferees hoped to argue that the government’s interest in fetal life outweighed the concerns of women who chose abortion for the wrong
reasons.226
Following Webster, NRLC built on this strategy by putting out
a model law that would outlaw abortion except in cases of rape,
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incest, fetal abnormality, or threats to a woman’s life or health.227 In
promoting these laws, NRLC lawyers compared conventional governmental interests—those related to fetal life—to a woman’s reasons for selecting abortion.228 Women who terminated pregnancy as
a means “of birth control” or for purposes of convenience, as NRLC
argued, would lose when the government invoked an interest in fetal
life.229 In 1990, Idaho’s legislature became the first to pass such a
law before Governor Cecil Andrus vetoed it.230 Louisiana considered a similar law in July.231 Although Louisiana Republican Governor Buddy Roemer vetoed the Louisiana bill, it seemed even more
likely that the Court would overrule after Justice William Brennan,
a consistent vote for abortion rights, announced his retirement the
same month.232 President George H.W. Bush chose David Souter, a
New Hampshire Supreme Court judge, to replace Brennan. 233
Likely hoping that Souter and Kennedy would vote to overturn Roe,
NRLC attorneys continued pressing bans like the failed effort in
Idaho.234 In January 1991, the effort paid off when Utah passed the
strictest antiabortion law in the nation, outlawing abortion except in
cases of rape, incest, “grave” fetal defect, or certain limited threats
to a woman’s health. 235 The following July, Justice Thurgood
227
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Marshall, another supporter of abortion rights, retired, and as his replacement, President George H.W. Bush nominated Judge Clarence
Thomas of the DC Circuit Court of Appeals. 236 Since Justice
Thomas was expected to vote to overrule Roe, it seemed to be only
a matter of time before the Court held that Roe was no longer good
law.
When the Supreme Court agreed to hear a challenge to a multirestriction Pennsylvania law in Casey, most abortion opponents focused on the flaws in the Roe decision, the reasons for undoing the
1973 decision, and the weak reasons that some women terminated
their pregnancies. 237 However, some pro-lifers focused on the
strength of the governmental interests in regulating or banning abortion.238 In a brief submitted on behalf of the American Association
of Pro-Life Obstetricians and Gynecologists (“AAPLOG”), for example, veteran pro-life attorneys William Bentley Ball and Maura
Quinlan stressed that Roe erred by too narrowly describing the government’s interest in women’s health and fetal life and by limiting
its application to later in pregnancy.239 Emphasizing that the government had an interest in protecting life, not potential life, Ball and
Quinlan urged the Court to recognize a compelling interest in protecting fetal life throughout pregnancy.240 Similarly, citing incidents
1991, at A10 [hereinafter Strict Anti-Abortion Law Signed in Utah]; Suit by ACLU
Challenges New Utah Anti-Abortion Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1991, at 21.
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of sub-standard abortion care, the AAPLOG brief maintained that
there was a compelling interest in protecting women’s health
throughout pregnancy.241
In a brief submitted on behalf of Feminists for Life and several
crisis pregnancy centers, Pat Buchanan’s American Center for Law
and Justice returned to a tactic developed in Akron I.242 The brief
insisted that Roe had too narrowly described the government’s interest in protecting women’s health.243 “A woman’s right to determine her own medical treatment, guaranteed by both common and
constitutional law, is illusory when the only information provider is
an entity with a financial interest in a particular outcome of her decisional process, and who supports only one option,” the brief argued.244 The brief reasoned that if the Court properly understood the
government’s compelling interests, then the justices would uphold
the Pennsylvania law.245
Casey dealt in complicated ways with social-movement debate
about when the government had a compelling interest in regulating
abortion. The Court began by reaffirming Roe’s essential holding—
that the Constitution protects a right to abortion.246 Interestingly, the
Court also retained viability as the point at which states could ban
most therapeutic abortions.247 While acknowledging that the time of
viability could change because of technological developments, the
Court concluded that these factual shifts in no way undermined the
soundness of viability as a constitutional marker.248 As the Court
explained, viability was the most workable endpoint that the courts
could identify.249 Additionally, because viability came late in pregnancy, the plurality reasoned that it was fair to ask women who
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waited until after viability to subordinate their interests to those of
the state.250
But, for the Casey plurality, the trimester framework was flawed
both because it neglected, or defined too narrowly, the government’s
interests and because it allowed the government to advance these
interests only later in pregnancy.251 Casey concluded that there was
no reason that the government could not ensure throughout pregnancy that a woman’s “choice is thoughtful and informed.”252 The
Court further stated that “[i]t follows that States are free to enact
laws to provide a reasonable framework for a woman to make a decision that has such profound and lasting meaning.”253 The government had an interest in protecting women’s mental and physical
health, as Casey reasoned.254 Moreover, the government could act
to advance its interest in “protecting the life of the unborn” by “expressing a preference for normal childbirth.”255
According to Casey, the government could justifiably act to protect life as long as the law was not designed specifically to undermine women’s rights.256 As the Court explained, “[t]he fact that a
law which serves a valid purpose, one not designed to strike at the
right itself, has the incidental effect of making it more difficult or
more expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it.” 257 Regulations were only problematic if they deprived
women of the right to make the ultimate decision.258 Importantly,
the government’s interest in protecting women’s mental health and
the life of the unborn mattered throughout pregnancy.259
As an alternative to the trimester framework, the Court adopted
a version of the undue burden standard.260 “A finding of an undue
burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has
the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of
250
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a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus,” Casey explained.261 What would it mean for a law to have an impermissible
purpose? First, Casey explained that the government could not primarily intend to obstruct a woman from receiving an abortion because “the means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the woman’s free choice,
not hinder it.”262 The Court further suggested that the government
had interests beyond protecting fetal life or women’s health.263 Casey reiterated that if a law severely limited abortion, it might be unconstitutional even if the law was “furthering the interest in potential
life or some other valid state interest.”264
What counted as examples of valid state interests? The Court
certainly went beyond the interest in protecting fetal life. 265 The
government could regulate abortion in such a way not only to prevent fetal killing but also to “express profound respect for the life of
the unborn.”266 Casey did not illuminate the boundaries of this state
interest.267 Did all abortion regulations express respect for the life of
the unborn? Was this interest stronger later in pregnancy rather than
earlier? How could courts tell the difference between a law designed
to obstruct women and a law expressing respect for the life of the
unborn? Casey raised these questions but answered none of them.268
Nevertheless, Casey did clarify that the government could act to
protect women’s health or to persuade women to choose childbirth
over abortion.269 However, there was still some ambiguity in how
Casey described these interests. Could the government protect
women’s emotional or psychological health, or was this interest narrower? Did laws designed to encourage a woman to carry a pregnancy to term have to expressly state such a goal—as an informedconsent regulation might?
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Casey did shed some light on these questions in its treatment of
the disputed Pennsylvania regulations.270 Consider Casey’s analysis
of the informed-consent restriction. Those challenging the law had
questioned whether it benefitted women’s health.271 After all, the
law required women to receive information about fetal development
that had no direct bearing on women’s health.272 Casey first suggested that the government could impose such a regulation even if
doing so did not advance an interest in women’s health.273 As Casey
explained, an informed-consent regulation could advance the government’s interest in expressing respect for life.274 However, Casey
also held that the mandatory-consent regulation protected women’s
health.275 “It cannot be questioned that psychological well-being is
a facet of health,” Casey reasoned.276 “In attempting to ensure that a
woman apprehend the full consequences of her decision, the State
furthers the legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a woman
may elect an abortion, only to discover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her decision was not fully informed.”277 The Court further upheld parental-involvement and record-keeping provisions.278
When the Court struck down a spousal-notification provision,
Casey focused on the women who would be most affected—those
who faced potential domestic violence if they had to notify their
husbands before terminating a pregnancy. 279 The Court hinted at
how purpose analysis would work in its approach to the spousalnotification law. 280 While the government had highlighted husbands’ interest in the life of the children their wives were carrying,281 the Court nevertheless implied that laws designed to force
women to consult with their spouses might have no rational basis.282
270
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As Casey reasoned, the law treated marriage as a relationship between equals who could make decisions of their own.283 “A State
may not give to a man the kind of dominion over his wife that parents exercise over their children,” Casey stated.284 The Court did not
suggest that Pennsylvania had sought nothing more than to obstruct
women seeking abortion. The government’s interest in men’s rights
was problematic in its own right.285 Casey thus suggested both that
the government could identify new justifications for regulating abortion and that some of those proposed interests could be constitutionally out of bounds.286
In the aftermath of Casey, it was not clear whether the Court’s
analysis of a statute’s purpose would help the supporters or the opponents of abortion rights. Could abortion-rights supporters readily
prove that a claimed government interest was pretextual? Would
abortion opponents be able to use Casey to identify a wide variety
of new interests and expand the government’s power to restrict abortion? Part III examines the Court’s answers to these questions.
III. FROM CASEY TO GONZALES: RECOGNITION OF NEW
PURPOSES
In the aftermath of Casey, those on both sides did not know what
the courts would make of Casey’s purpose prong.287 Would the purpose prong allow abortion-rights supporters to more effectively attack new regulations? How easily could abortion foes convince the
Court to recognize new justifications for limiting abortion? This Part
begins by exploring the first major decision to discuss Casey’s purpose prong, Mazurek v. Armstrong.288 Next, this Part looks at prolifers’ response to Casey and Mazurek, especially the expansion of
the government’s interest in protecting women. Finally, this Part examines how the fight against what pro-lifers called partial-birth
abortion encouraged the antiabortion movement to focus more on
the recognition of abstract new governmental purposes. This
283
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initiative contributed to the Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Carhart,289 a decision that energized those who saw the recognition of
new governmental interests as a strategy for undermining abortion
rights.
A. Interpreting Casey
Immediately after Casey, those on both sides contested the
meaning of the undue burden standard. 290 In Mazurek, the Court
seemed poised to clarify the meaning of the test. That case involved
a 1995 Montana regulation prohibiting physician assistants from
performing abortions, requiring all second-trimester abortions to be
performed in a hospital, and banning advertisements for abortion.291
A group of plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the law and
sought a preliminary injunction.292 The district court had enjoined
the provisions requiring abortions to be in hospitals and banning solicitation of abortion services, but concluded that the physician-only
requirement did not create an undue burden.293 The Ninth Circuit
reversed, enjoining the physician-only requirement and holding that
respondents had shown a fair chance of success on the merits of their
claim, and thus had met the threshold requirement for preliminary
injunctive relief.294
When the Supreme Court took the case, the justices addressed
whether the plaintiffs had a fair chance of success in showing that
the physician-only requirement created an undue burden. Lawyers
working with the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy (now the
Center for Reproductive Rights) stressed that Montana was a rural
state with few physicians. 295 The Center argued that as a result,
eliminating access to physician assistants would force women in the
state seeking abortions to drive to a single abortion clinic in Bozeman, Montana, to be treated by a female provider.296 Much of the
Center’s argument centered on Casey’s purpose prong.297 Montana
289
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claimed that the law was designed to protect women’s health.298 The
Center contended that this was pretext.299
What proof was there of pretext? First, the Center emphasized
that there was no problem that the law had solved—all the available
evidence suggested that physician assistants safely performed abortions. 300 Second, Montana had singled out abortion for additional
regulation allowing physician assistants to perform what were unquestionably riskier procedures. 301 Moreover, evidence suggested
that the lawmakers backing the bill acted on behalf of Montana
Right to Life, a group that openly aimed to end all abortions.302
Mazurek rejected these arguments, seemingly undercutting Casey’s purpose prong.303 According to the Court’s interpretation, the
Ninth Circuit held that the law was problematic solely because of its
purpose, not its effect. 304 Mazurek called into question whether
courts could ever justifiably strike down a law only on the basis of
having an impermissible purpose.305 But even if Casey authorized
such a result, the Court held that Montana’s law would pass muster
under Casey’s purpose prong.306 The Court first suggested that lawmakers had significant latitude in requiring professionals to do a job
even if objective evidence suggested that this requirement had no
benefit.307 Nor did the fact that a pro-life group had drafted the law
sway the Court.308
Mazurek suggested that the purpose prong of Casey might help
pro-lifers more than supporters of abortion rights. 309 Indeed, Mazurek introduced more confusion into the Court’s analysis of the
purpose of antiabortion legislation. First, Casey had sent contradictory signals about how many legitimate interests the government
could identify in restricting abortion and how readily abortion-rights
298
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supporters could smoke out an insidious goal. 310 Then, Mazurek
suggested that it would be practically impossible to challenge the
purpose of a law.311
Antiabortion groups responded by seeking to define more
broadly the interests that the Court had already recognized. In particular, for both political and constitutional reasons, groups like
AUL sought to convince the Court to adopt a broad understanding
of the government’s interest in protecting women’s health. 312 As
early as 1987, pro-life activist David Reardon wrote C. Everett
Koop, then the Surgeon General, arguing that a focus on women’s
health might “launch [the] nation into a new era of debate about
abortion, one based not on fetus vs. woman rhetoric, but rather on
the facts about what abortion does to women alone.”313 As Reva
Siegel has shown, abortion opponents in the late 1980s and early
1990s faced a perfect storm: the election of pro-choice President Bill
Clinton, the radicalization of the clinic-blockade movement, and the
murder of abortion providers and clinic staff. 314 These circumstances convinced abortion opponents to change their argumentative
strategy.315 At an AUL conference for state legislators, Laurie Ann
Ramsey summarized the results of market research on the image of
the antiabortion movement: “[W]e are also viewed as extremists,
hypercritical, violent, intolerant and unconcerned about women,
poverty and homelessness.”316 “The [movement’s] focus on concern
for the unborn child neglects mention of the mother of that child,”
Mary Ellen Jensen, a public-relations specialist at AUL explained at

310

See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 898 (1992).
See Mazurek, 520 U.S. at 972–74.
312
See generally Ziegler, Liberty and the Politics of Balance, supra note 66,
at 445–49.
313
Letter from David Reardon to C. Everett Koop, U.S. Surgeon Gen. (Sept.
14, 1987) (on file with author) [hereinafter Letter to C. Everett Koop].
314
See Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1714 (2008).
315
Id. at 1715.
316
Laurie Anne Ramsey, How Public Opinion Polls Should Guide Pro-Life
Strategy, Speech at the Americans United for Life Legislators Educ. Conference (Aug. 2–4, 1991), at 4 (on file with Schlesinger Library, Harvard University,
in the Mildred F. Jefferson Papers, Box 13, Folder 8).
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the time. 317 “Communicating greater concern for the women . . .
must be a key objective of any pro-life communication strategy.”318
After Casey, AUL prioritized what pro-lifers called “right to
know” laws, informed-consent mandates that would sway women to
carry pregnancies to term and would position the debate in broader
terms.319 In defending these laws, AUL and NRLC would expand
on the government’s interest in protecting women’s mental health—
a governmental purpose hinted at in Casey itself.320
B. Partial-Birth Abortion and New Purposes
In the leadup to the Supreme Court’s next case, Gonzales v. Carhart, pro-lifers experimented with a more ambitious agenda, convincing the Court to recognize new governmental interests instead
of just expanding existing ones. The years leading up to Gonzales
turned on discussion of what pro-lifers called partial-birth abortion,
a procedure whereby a provider removed a fetus intact from a
woman’s uterus.321 The procedure first came to NRLC’s attention
after Dr. Martin Haskell gave a paper on the procedure at the annual
conference of the National Abortion Federation (“NAF”).322 Minnesota abortion opponents got a copy of the paper and created a sketch
of the abortion procedure that Haskell described, using this material
in an advertisement opposing the Freedom of Choice Act, a proposed federal bill that would have codified abortion rights. 323 By
1995, when Republicans took control of the House of Representatives for the first time in decades, NRLC emphasized a federal bill
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banning the procedure.324 First drafted in 1995, the federal Partial
Birth Abortion Ban Act (“PBABA”) outlawed “an abortion in which
the person performing the abortion partially vaginally delivers a living fetus before killing the fetus and completing the delivery.”325
How did abortion opponents describe the purpose of the law?
After all, outlawing one abortion procedure did not seem to protect
fetal life. 326 The proposal left available any other abortion
method.327 So why had Congress singled out one procedure? Strategically, the emphasis on partial birth abortion had a clear payoff.
Douglas Johnson of NRLC labeled the law “an educational exercise.” 328 “Many Americans wrongly believe that abortion is not
available after 13 weeks of pregnancy,” Johnson said.329 “We want
people to be aware that abortions are being performed on unborn
human beings, 20 weeks and beyond, when they look like babies
and have a capacity to feel pain.”330
In fighting for the PBABA, pro-lifers and their allies in Congress
built on Johnson’s suggestion about fetal pain, suggesting that the
government had an interest in preventing fetal suffering or

324
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gratuitous insults to fetal dignity.331 Pro-lifers pushed similar laws
in the states and, in 2000, the Supreme Court agreed to hear a challenge to one of them in Stenberg v. Carhart.332
That case addressed the constitutionality of a Nebraska law outlawing “an abortion procedure in which the person performing the
abortion partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before
killing the unborn child and completing the delivery.”333 Noting the
wording of the statute, those challenging the Nebraska law argued
that it would ban not only D&X but also D&E, the most widely used
second-trimester abortion procedure.334 Those challenging the law
further contended that it created an undue burden even if it covered
only D&X because the law lacked a health exception.335 By depriving women of what would be the safest abortion procedure under
certain circumstances, as the challengers reasoned, the law unduly
burdened women’s rights.336 Nebraska responded that the law covered only D&X and that there was inadequate evidence that D&X
was safer for women than available alternatives.337
The majority sided with those challenging the law, concluding
that Nebraska had banned D&X and unduly burdened women.338
Justice Anthony Kennedy’s dissent sent a different signal to the antiabortion movement. 339 Because of the message sent by Justice
Kennedy’s dissent, the Court’s decision in Stenberg sharpened

331
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abortion foes’ interest in promoting more legislative justifications
for abortion regulations.
Justice Kennedy highlighted the legitimacy of what he saw as
the interests underlying Nebraska’s ban.340 To be sure, as Kennedy
reasoned, the law might advance an interest in protecting fetal
life.341 But Kennedy went further, stating: “States also have an interest in forbidding medical procedures which, in the State’s reasonable determination, might cause the medical profession or society as
a whole to become insensitive, even disdainful, to life, including life
in the human fetus.”342 Kennedy suggested that there was something
about D&X that would undermine the image that many held of physicians as healers.343
What was it about the procedure that would arguably have this
effect? “D & X’s stronger resemblance to infanticide means Nebraska could conclude the procedure presents a greater risk of disrespect for life and a consequent greater risk to the profession and
society, which depend for their sustenance upon reciprocal recognition of dignity and respect,” Kennedy reasoned.344
Because of the appearance of D&X, the procedure undermined
respect for fetal life—an interest that went beyond an interest in preventing fetal killing.345 Equally important, as Kennedy saw it, prohibiting this one method of abortion would send a message about
the dignity of human life.346 As Kennedy stated,
Nebraska instructs all participants in the abortion
process, including the mother, of its moral judgment
that all life, including the life of the unborn, is to be
respected . . . The differentiation between the procedures is itself a moral statement, serving to promote
respect for human life; and if the woman and her physician in contemplating the moral consequences of
the prohibited procedure conclude that grave moral
consequences pertain to the permitted abortion
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
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process as well, the choice to elect or not to elect
abortion is more informed; and the policy of promoting respect for life is advanced.347
Congress had twice passed a federal partial-birth-abortion ban,
but President Clinton had vetoed it. 348 Starting in 2002, notwithstanding the Court’s decision in Stenberg, pro-lifers again called for
a federal ban. 349 Kennedy’s Stenberg dissent later provided a
roadmap for those demanding such a ban: Congress would have to
make extensive findings on both the purpose of the law and the need
for a health exception. 350 The version of the PBABA ultimately
passed in 2003 first defined the prohibited procedure more narrowly,
arguably excluding D&E procedures.351 Congress also made findings supporting both the need for the law and justification for eliminating a health exception.352
When it came to the purpose of the law, Congress deliberately
went beyond justifications related to the prevention of fetal killing.353 One interest involved attitudes toward fetal life: banning a
procedure that many found gruesome would improve the odds that
people would view fetal life with respect or reverence. 354 As
347
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Congress explained: “Implicitly approving such a brutal and inhumane procedure by choosing not to prohibit it will further coarsen
society to the humanity of not only newborns, but all vulnerable and
innocent human life, making it increasingly difficult to protect such
life.”355 President George W. Bush signed the federal ban into law
in 2003,356 and when the Supreme Court agreed to hear a challenge
to the law, pro-lifers again sought to carve out new justifications for
regulating abortion. A brief submitted on behalf of a group of
women who claimed to have suffered post-abortion trauma argued
that the federal PBABA was intended to protect women’s mental
health.357 Congress, as the brief argued, acted to ban partial birth
abortion in the belief that the procedure “poses serious risks to the
long-term health of women and in some circumstances, their
lives.”358 Other briefs foregrounded an interest in preserving the integrity of the medical profession.359
C. Interpreting Gonzales
Gonzales vindicated those who believed that the recognition of
new governmental interests would erode abortion rights. 360 The
Court began by rejecting arguments that the challenged law was unconstitutionally vague or outlawed both D&E and D&X.361 The majority turned then to the application of the undue burden standard.362
Justice Kennedy’s majority canvassed the purposes underlying the
act.363
355

Id. at § 1531(14)(N).
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First, Gonzales recognized a justification in expressing “respect
for the dignity of human life.”364 What did this entail? In part, as the
Court reasoned, Congress could act to reinforce a distinction between infanticide and abortion.365 Kennedy also suggested that Congress could seek to protect women from post-abortion regret. 366
“Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of
love the mother has for her child . . . Whether to have an abortion
requires a difficult and painful moral decision[,]” Kennedy explained.367 “While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to
regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained.”368 Gonzales further held that the law was constitutional notwithstanding the law’s lack of a health exception.369 The Court reasoned that if a matter was scientifically uncertain, Congress had the
power to intervene.370
Notably, Gonzales stood in tension with earlier decisions addressing the government’s interest in fetal life or women’s health.
When it came to fetal life, the Court previously focused on the protection of fetal life as opposed to fetal dignity or the quality of fetal
life.371 Was the idea of respect for life articulated in Gonzales a new
state interest? Had the Court redefined fetal personhood—a concept
rejected by Roe? The Court provided little guidance on these matters.372 What about the government’s interest in protecting women’s
mental health? The Court had cast doubt on the validity of this interest in Akron I and Thornburgh. 373 Although Casey partly
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overruled these decisions,374 Gonzales suggested that the government’s interest in protecting women was far broader than Casey implied: an interest that came into play even when abortion-related
counseling was not at issue.375 How broad was this interest? Would
any abortion restriction protect women by lowering the chances of
abortion regret?
Gonzales also encouraged AUL and NRLC to identify new compelling interests underlying abortion regulation. By doing so, abortion opponents hoped to replace viability with an earlier time when
abortion could be banned.376 However, some pro-lifers had a more
ambitious plan.377 Gonzales gave legislators so much room to regulate that some abortion opponents believed that the undue burden
standard had become rational basis review by another name. 378
When the Supreme Court agreed to hear a challenge to Texas’s H.B.
2, antiabortion lawyers tried to formalize that the undue burden test
provided little protection for abortion rights. 379 Whole Woman’s
Health represented a setback for pro-life lawyers, reinvigorating the
purpose prong of Casey.380 However, as Part IV shows, the Court’s
most recent decision left uncertain what it would mean for a statute
to have a legitimate purpose under Casey.
IV. A MEANINGFUL PURPOSE ANALYSIS: WHOLE WOMAN’S
HEALTH
In 2016, the Supreme Court agreed to hear its first abortion case
in more than a decade. 381 Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt
374
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involved two parts of Texas’ H.B. 2.382 One required abortion doctors to have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles.383
A second mandated that abortion clinics comply with state regulations governing ambulatory surgical centers (“ASC”).384 This Part
begins by exploring the strategic stakes of the case for both opposing
social movements. Pro-lifers set aside a focus on the purpose of a
law, arguing instead that the undue burden standard was so deferential that no analysis of a statute’s purpose was required. As this Part
shows next, the Court rejected this argument, weaving analysis of a
statute’s purpose into a balancing analysis. But as this Part concludes, Whole Woman’s Health left open crucial questions about
how courts should approach new justifications for abortion regulations.
A. The Stakes of Whole Woman’s Health
AUL predicted that Whole Woman’s Health would be “the most
significant abortion case before the Supreme Court in decades.”385
Why did the case command so much attention? In Texas, the impact
of H.B. 2 seemed likely to be profound. Most providers did not have
and likely could not get admitting privileges because, among other
reasons, not enough women went to the hospital after an abortion to
meet threshold admitting requirements. 386 For many clinics, the
ASC requirements would be prohibitively expensive, especially
those demanding the overhaul of clinic facilities.387 Data suggested
that it would cost clinics $1 million to comply with the ASC regulations; it would be three times more to build a new facility.388 If the
Court upheld Texas’ law, other states with antiabortion laws already
on the books would be able to pass laws similar to H.B. 2.
382
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Pro-life lawyers hoped to establish that the undue burden standard required courts to uphold almost all abortion regulations.389 Ever
since Casey came down, opposing activists had contested the meaning of the standard.390 Following Gonzales, abortion foes hoped that
the Court would clarify that the standard was deferential and toothless. 391 When the Court agreed to hear a challenge to H.B. 2, it
seemed that the time had come to establish what the undue burden
standard really required.392
Abortion providers first challenged only the admitting-privileges law.393 While the district court held that the requirement created an undue burden, the Fifth Circuit reversed.394 Not long after
the Fifth Circuit’s decision, abortion providers returned to court, this
time challenging the ASC regulation and arguing that the admittingprivileges mandate was unconstitutional as applied to clinics in
McAllen and El Paso.395 Although the district court again sided with
Whole Woman’s Health, 396 the Fifth Circuit reversed a second
time.397 In part, the court relied on the doctrine of res judicata, emphasizing that providers could have raised the same challenges during their original lawsuit.398 The court further offered its perspective
on what the undue burden standard required. 399 “Following Carhart and Casey,” the court explained, “our circuit conducts a twostep approach, first applying a rational basis test, then independently
determining if the burden on a woman’s choice is undue.”400

389
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When the Supreme Court took the case, those on both sides disputed what the undue burden standard required. 401 Representing
Whole Woman’s Health, the Center for Reproductive Rights insisted that “[t]he undue burden standard strikes a careful balance between a woman’s liberty to make decisions about childbearing . . . with the State’s profound interest in potential life.”402 What
did this balancing require? The Center argued that the courts had to
weigh “the severity of the obstacle relative to the strength of the
state's interest in imposing it.”403 To determine the purpose of the
law, the Center argued, the Court should not blindly accept the legislators’ account of what they were doing. 404 Instead, the Court
sould evaluate whether a law reasonably advanced its stated end.405
What about the effect of the law? The Center argued that the
decrease in abortion access would have an impermissible effect, “increasing the wait time for appointments at abortion facilities and the
distances that many women would have to travel to reach those facilities.”406 Insisting that these effects had to be weighed against the
health benefits (or lack thereof) created by the Texas law, the Center
argued that H.B. 2 unduly burdened women’s rights.407
Texas read the undue burden standard quite differently.408 Texas
argued that, rather than evaluating the strength of the government’s
purpose, the Court should recognize that “[c]onstitutional analysis
of a statute’s purpose is highly deferential.”409 The fact that lawmakers knew or should know that H.B. 2 would close clinics did not
change the analysis.410 “In any industry, businesses that do not meet
governing regulations may not be able to operate, and a legislature
may be well aware of that fact[,]” Texas reasoned.411 “But that does
not prove a legislative purpose to produce whatever effects may
401
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flow from closing a business, rather than to achieve the public-welfare benefits of the regulations.”412 When it came to the law’s effects, Texas argued that most women would still live near metropolitan areas with an abortion clinic.413
B. Purpose Under Whole Woman’s Health
In June 2016, a short-handed Court handed down a five-to-three
decision adopting a balancing analysis similar to the one proposed
by the Center.414 Holding that res judicata did not bar the petitioners’ challenge, the Court addressed the meaning of the undue burden
standard. 415 The Court first established that under Casey, “courts
consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with
the benefits those laws confer.”416 The Court pointed to two provisions analyzed by Casey as an example of how the test should apply:
the parental-involvement law upheld in that case and the spousalnotification measure struck down by the Court.417 In both of these
cases, as Whole Woman’s Health explained, the Court performed a
“balancing.”418
The Court further clarified what kind of evidence courts would
use in performing this balancing. 419 Texas had argued that under
Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court’s earlier decision upholding the federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act, courts should defer to lawmakers’ assessments of contested scientific evidence.420 Because lawmakers believed that H.B. 2 was needed to protect women’s health,
as Texas asserted, the Court should defer to the legislatures’ reasoning.421 Whole Woman’s Health held instead that courts should independently assess the purpose and effect of a law,422 placing the most
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“weight upon evidence and argument presented in judicial proceedings.”423
It was obvious that Whole Woman’s Health treated the undue
burden standard as something quite different from rational basis, and
the Court viewed the purpose of a law as constitutionally meaningful
and deserving of some scrutiny.424 But how exacting was purpose
analysis, and what precisely did Whole Woman’s Health require as
part of the purpose analysis? The Court’s analysis of H.B. 2 offered
some clues. When it came to the admitting-privileges provision,
Texas claimed that the requirement would “ensure that women have
easy access to a hospital should complications arise during an abortion procedure.”425 In evaluating the admitting-privileges requirement, the Court first emphasized the safety of abortion procedures:
most procedures came early in pregnancy, and even in later trimesters, the rate of complications was exceedingly low.426 Lawmakers had a less compelling purpose because “there was no significant health-related problem that the new law helped to cure.”427
The Court next examined evidence about the benefit conferred
by the admitting-privilege requirement as compared to the law previously in place. 428 Stressing that the rare complications that did
arise emerged after a woman left an abortion clinic, the Court reasoned that there was no evidence that the requirement helped any
women.429 Against this lack of benefit, the Court weighed the burden created by the law.430 The Court noted that the number of clinics
in Texas fell by half after the government implemented the requirement.431 The Court found enough evidence that H.B. 2 caused the
clinic closures: most clinics could not meet admitting-privilege requirements because, among other reasons, abortion was safe enough
that hospital admissions were rare.432 Clinic closures, in turn, meant
longer travel distances, “fewer doctors, longer waiting times, and
423
424
425
426
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429
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increased crowding.”433 These burdens, weighed against the lack of
a benefit created by the requirement, led the Court to hold the admitting-privilege requirement unconstitutional.434
The Court applied a similar analysis to the ASC provision. Because many women received abortion via medication or procedures
performed through the birth canal, the Court reasoned that many of
the ASC requirements would not benefit women.435 Even in the case
of surgical abortions, most of the ASC requirements were irrelevant. 436 Emphasizing the safety of abortion, the Court concluded
that the ASC provision conferred no benefit compared to the regulations that Texas had previously put in place.437
What can we glean about purpose analysis from Whole Woman’s
Health? To be sure, the membership of the Court is in flux, and the
Court’s vision of the undue burden standard could easily change
again. Moreover, Whole Woman’s Health did not answer many of
the crucial questions surrounding purpose analysis in the abortion
context. Before the Court’s decision, those in opposing movements
clashed about how many interests were legitimate in the abortion
context.438 Should lawmakers limit themselves to the interests recognized in Casey and Gonzales? Or, were there a potentially limitless list of governmental interests that could justify abortion regulations? Some key pro-life initiatives depended on the Court’s recognition of more governmental interests.439 Whole Woman’s Health
left uncertain the fate of this effort.440
And how would courts determine if a law addressed a real problem? It seemed straightforward when lawmakers claimed that a law
had a tangible, quantifiable benefit, like reducing post-abortion
complications or more effectively addressing them. 441 But how
would the Court resolve a law like the federal PBABA? What procedure would the Court use to evaluate if there was a problem with
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public respect for human life? Or a lack of dignity assigned to fetal
life?
Whole Woman’s Health also shed little light on how important
the purpose prong was in relation to the effect that a law would have
on abortion access.442 If a law advanced a compelling interest, however a court defined it, would that justify significant burdens on the
abortion decision? Is the purpose prong more important than the effect prong or vice versa?
These are significant ambiguities. The future of many of the
most important antiabortion proposals turns partly on how the Court
answers open questions about the purpose analysis under Casey.443
In promoting twenty-week bans and dismemberment prohibitions,
abortion opponents hope that the Court will replace viability with an
earlier biological marker: the point at which unborn children can
theoretically experience pain.444 Whole Woman’s Health does not
illuminate how or when the courts should acknowledge new governmental interests, especially when the government’s justification relates to fetal life rather than women’s health.445 Pro-lifers also champion scientifically contested or abstract justifications for laws involving matters like D&E, the disposal of fetal remains, and the prohibition of later abortions.446 When it comes to abstract governmental interests, like the preservation of fetal dignity, the Court’s most
recent decision offers little guidance to lower courts.447 By contrast,
when the purpose for a law depends on disputed evidence, Whole
Woman’s Health offers only a few clues about how courts should
resolve these battles or how to read Gonzales’ deference on this subject.
How should the Court resolve these ambiguities? Part V develops a doctrinal approach that will clarify the application of Whole
Woman’s Health, offering more guidance to legislators and protecting the delicate balance struck by Casey and its progeny.
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V. HOW TO MEASURE PURPOSE: A CLARIFICATION
Whole Woman’s Health provides a useful starting point for
courts seeking to develop a more coherent purpose analysis. This
Part proposes a doctrinal clarification that courts should use in understanding the purpose prong of Casey and Whole Woman’s
Health. Next, this Part explores how this analysis would apply to
some of the antiabortion legislation now under consideration.
Whole Woman’s Health, like Casey and Gonzales, held open the
possibility that legislators could identify new justifications for regulating abortion. The question, however, is how courts should approach both new justifications for abortion regulations and familiar
ones. Lawmakers introducing new abortion legislation should first
have to articulate a legislative goal with adequate specificity. Instead
of stating that a law protects fetal dignity, for example, legislators
should have to define fetal dignity and explain how a law preserves
it. Similarly, when lawmakers claim to protect women’s health, legislators should explain the precise benefit that a law will achieve.
This requirement is reconcilable with the Court’s past decisions.
In Gonzales, for example, Congress did not clearly define fetal dignity.448 Nonetheless, as the Court noted, Congress did explain why
a ban on dilation and extraction—as opposed to any other abortion
procedure—raised special concern about fetal dignity.449 Similarly,
in Whole Woman’s Health, the Court defined the relevant government interests with specificity: rather than examining an abstract interest in women’s health, for example, the Court considered whether
an admitting-privilege requirement would make it easier for women
to receive appropriate hospital care.450
Next, courts should apply a three-part test to gauge the strength
of a statute’s purpose, examining: (1) whether a law addresses an
identifiable problem; (2) whether the law improves on the results
achieved by previous policies; and (3) whether the law has some
quantifiable (if not numerically specific) benefit. These requirements crystallize analysis already at work in Casey and its progeny.451 How might they apply in practice?
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First consider the requirement of an identifiable problem. In
some cases, application of this requirement will be straightforward.
When lawmakers claim that a law protects women from the psychological consequences of abortion, for example, the frequency and
severity of post-abortion psychological sequelae should be measurable. In other instances, when lawmakers claim a more abstract interest, such as protecting fetal dignity, it might be harder to document the problem that lawmakers set out to solve. As an initial matter, lawmakers should explain how fetal dignity has been disrespected beyond the fact that abortion—which the Court still treats
as a protected liberty—is legal. Lawmakers should also provide examples of when and how members of the public, physicians, or other
relevant constituencies have demonstrated disrespect for fetal life.
Requiring legislators to identify a problem will help courts distinguish laws with a legitimate purpose from those prohibited by Casey.452
Next, courts should examine whether a law improves on the result achieved by previously-implemented policies. Any abortion
regulation could arguably enhance respect for fetal dignity. But Casey and Whole Woman’s Health emphasize a balance between
women’s protected liberty and the government’s interest in fetal
life.453 Allowing states to justify any abortion regulation by pointing
to an interest in fetal dignity would eviscerate this balance. By contrast, mandating that the government explain how a law adds value,
compared to previously implemented abortion regulations, will help
courts distinguish laws that effectively advance a valid purpose.
Take, as an example, a ban on D&E or dismemberment abortion.
D&E may be considered as gruesome as D&X.454 Abortion opponents claim that such a law advances an interest in fetal dignity because D&E is especially gruesome. 455 But lawmakers and abortion
opponents have not explained how D&E is especially likely, compared to other abortion procedures, to undermine respect for fetal
452
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life or affect attitudes toward fetal life.456 By contrast, in Gonzales,
the Court emphasized details about partial-birth abortion that made
it resemble normal delivery.457 For this reason, D&X raised special
concerns not associated with other abortions. 458 No similar argument seems to apply to bans on D&E.459
Finally, courts should demand proof that a law has some quantifiable benefit. This benefit need not be a specific number of people
benefitted by a law, but lawmakers should have the burden of
demonstrating a concrete benefit. If a benefit is too abstract for
courts to meaningfully measure, the balance commanded by Casey
will almost certainly be at risk.460
How could the government quantify the benefit that a statute delivers? Consider one of the latest mandatory-counseling laws, requiring women to receive information about the possibility of reversing medication abortion.461 Those backing these laws emphasize that they protect women who regret having an abortion after
taking part of a two-drug protocol often required for medication
abortion.462 To quantify the benefit provided by such a law, lawmakers should bring forth evidence that medication abortion is reversible. Legislators should also have some evidence—ideally peer-reviewed studies—indicating that a reasonable number of women regret choosing medication abortion and would benefit from a reversal
procedure if an effective one existed. If no such evidence exists, as
some researchers suggest, then such a law has no legitimate purpose.463
What about more abstract goals, like enhancing respect for fetal
life? It may be impossible to document that a law has a positive effect on attitudes about fetal dignity. How would lawmakers know if
456
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prior to the enactment of a law, people viewed fetal life with disrespect? And how could legislators demonstrate that a statute reshaped
anyone’s views? It may be possible for lawmakers to explain more
precisely what respect for fetal life means and how it could be evaluated. If so, requiring some quantification of a benefit would ensure
that legislators do not simply claim an abstract goal to cover up an
impermissible purpose, such as discrimination against women or a
desire to obstruct abortion access. If lawmakers cannot find a way
to measure the benefit of a law when it comes to respect for life, then
courts should factor the lack of a proven benefit into the balancing
that Casey commands.464
We can get a better sense of this analysis of Casey’s purpose
prong by applying it to current legislation. Those promoting twentyweek bans claim that such laws prevent fetal pain and thereby enhance respect for fetal life.465 Courts would begin by asking lawmakers to define their purported interest with as much specificity as
possible; rather than referring to hard-to-pin-down ideas about dignity, legislators would claim an interest in preventing fetal pain.
Next, a court would determine whether twenty-week bans solve
a documentable problem. Evidence on the existence of fetal pain at
or before the twentieth week of pregnancy is contested.466 Pain receptors are present at this point in pregnancy, and as a result, some
researchers argue that fetal pain is possible by the twentieth week.467
Most published studies argue that other requirements for the experience of fetal pain do not develop until later in pregnancy, and the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists has concluded that fetal pain is not possible as early as twenty weeks’ gestation.468 At best, the evidence regarding the possibility of fetal pain
464
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is disputed, and so courts would regard the problem supposedly
solved by twenty-week bans as questionable.
Even if such a law did address a real problem, courts would ask
whether a twenty-week ban improved on the result achieved by previously implemented laws and whether such a law had a quantifiable
benefit. Many states ban or heavily regulate abortions later in pregnancy, at or near the time of viability, when fetal pain is more
likely.469 Other states, like Utah, require fetal anesthesia.470 Given
the weak evidence supporting fetal pain at twenty weeks, it is not
clear that twenty-week bans add significant value compared to existing regulations of later abortions.471
After applying this analysis of a law’s purpose, a court would
consider the effect of a law under Casey. Only slightly more than
one percent of women have abortions after the twentieth week.472
But as Casey and Whole Woman’s Health reason, the question is
how a law impacts the women most directly affected by a law.473
For these women, a twenty-week ban would eliminate access to
abortion altogether before viability—the endpoint recognized by
Casey.474 Given a state’s relatively weak interest in preventing pain
and the severe effect such a law would have on the women directly
affected by a twenty-week ban, a court would likely strike down a
fetal-pain law.
Laws regulating the disposal of fetal remains would present a
closer case.475 On one hand, it would be hard for lawmakers to explain with adequate specificity what the purpose of such a law would
be or to provide concrete evidence that such a law would advance
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that interest. On the other hand, lawmakers could argue that mandating the burial or cremation of fetal remains would improve on
what the law previously allowed—the treatment of fetal remains as
medical waste.476 In Gonzales, the Court recognized an interest in
protecting respect for life partly because dilation and extraction
seemed more likely to coarsen attitudes toward fetal life than comparable alternatives that did not resemble ordinary childbirth. 477
Lawmakers might similarly be able to explain how the treatment of
fetal remains as medical waste is especially problematic. Much will
depend on whether lawmakers can define an interest clearly enough
and provide some proof that a change in the law will enhance respect
for fetal life. Those challenging such laws have argued that they
raise the cost of an abortion by requiring abortion clinics to undertake costly burial or cremation procedures.478 If the government cannot adequately describe the benefit provided by such a law, it might
be unconstitutional as well.479
CONCLUSION
Some of the inconsistency defining the Court’s abortion jurisprudence stems from the shifting treatment of the justification for
abortion regulations. The Court has wavered in its willingness to
recognize new rationales for restricting abortion and its tendency to
broaden existing interests. This incoherence has real stakes for rights
involved in the abortion conflict. Pro-life incrementalists have
championed new legislative interests to allow lawmakers to ban
abortion earlier in pregnancy, to covertly reshape the Court’s view
of fetal personhood, and to allow for a wider range of regulations.
Whole Women’s Health does not fully explain how courts should
evaluate the purpose of abortion regulations. To clarify how judges
should measure the claimed benefit of a law, the Court should demand more precision when it comes to the problem and solution that
lawmakers have identified. Anything less will undermine the careful
balance Casey demands.
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